What Would Iran Do with the Bomb?

By Сергей Дудиков @Adobe Stock

At Foreign Policy, Sina Azodi examines what a nuclear-armed Iran might do with its new power. Azodi writes:

For starters, a nuclear weapon arsenal—even if modest—would dramatically enhance Iran’s ability to assert its power in the Persian Gulf. This waterway, a priority for both the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic Republic, is crucial to Iran’s national security. Following the British navy’s withdrawal in 1971, the Shah swiftly asserted Iran’s control over the key islands of the Greater and Lesser Tunbs as well as Abu Musa. In 1976, he stated that “the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz in truth constitute Iran’s lifeline. If this area were in any way threatened, our very life would be endangered.” From his perspective, foreign forces in the Persian Gulf posed a direct threat to Iran’s security.

The leadership of the Islamic Republic shares this strategic outlook. Former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has echoed the Shah’s sentiments, stating that the Persian Gulf is a “vital lifeline and thus a national security priority for Iran [and that] any extraregional presence is by definition a source of insecurity.” Iranian forces have frequently harassed U.S. Navy ships in what they view as their own backyard, underscoring Tehran’s continued opposition to any foreign military presence in the region.

With a nuclear deterrent, Iran could more assertively press its territorial claims, such as forcing the United Arab Emirates to back down from its dispute over the Tunbs and Abu Musa and threatening international shipping if its own interests were threatened. Furthermore, nuclear weapons would allow Iran to confront U.S. and other foreign forces in the Persian Gulf with greater confidence, as the threat of nuclear escalation could deter military retaliation.

Iran’s relationship with Israel, in particular, continues to be adversarial. Despite the harsh rhetoric, however, the Iranian leadership is cognizant of Israel’s conventional superiority and nuclear advantage. When, in April, Israel attacked Iran’s diplomatic facility in Damascus, killing an Iranian military commander, Iran responded by launching several hundred ballistic missiles and drones—some of which penetrated the Israeli missile defense system. Yet Iran deliberately downplayed Israel’s retaliatory response, which targeted an air defense system near the city of Isfahan, to avoid a broader conflict with Israel and by extension the United States.

A nuclear-armed Iran would significantly reshape this dynamic. Nuclear weapons could erode Israel’s long-standing monopoly by significantly increasing Iran’s standing in the region. At the same time, they could also exacerbate the ongoing low-intensity conflict between the two states, since both countries could rely on their nuclear arsenals to shield them from conventional escalation, a dynamic widely known as the stability-instability paradox.

Relatedly, nuclear weapons will have a bolstering effect on Iran’s relationship with its proxy forces, namely Hezbollah—one of the pillars of Iran’s defense strategy. This does not mean that Iran would transfer nuclear technology to its proxy force, as this could increase the potential use of nuclear weapons, undermining its own security. But nuclear weapons could reduce the risks and costs associated with supporting these groups, as foreign powers will be further discouraged from deterring Iran’s support for such groups.

More generally, nuclear weapons could reshape the Iranian leadership’s perception of the country’s “rightful” role in geopolitics. Its status as a nuclear power would significantly enhance Tehran’s diplomatic leverage, allowing it to seek security, political, and economic concessions. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad captured this sentiment when he announced in 2006 that Iran had joined the world’s “nuclear club” after successfully mastering the enrichment fuel cycle. Since abandoning its weaponization efforts in 2003, Iran has systematically deployed its expanding nuclear program to seek concessions from global powers that otherwise would not grant Iran a seat at the negotiation table. These include trade, commercial integration, and nuclear safety cooperation embedded in the text of the Iran nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Indeed, Iran’s nuclear expansion during this period was not driven by security factors but as a leveraging mechanism.

Nuclear weapons would also enable Iran to act more independently of its great-power partners—namely Russia, which is increasingly bringing Iran into its sphere of influence. In this context, nuclear weapons make a partnership with Russia less valuable because Iran would need less protection from Moscow. Nuclear weapons would reduce the costs for Iran to act independently of Russia and even improve ties with the West. This was captured in March 2022 by a Russian commentator who suggested that a nuclear-armed Iran would be far less dangerous than a pro-West Iran. Russia has in the past undermined Iran’s nuclear talks with the West to prevent normalization of that relationship. Iran’s support for Russia in Ukraine has come at a great cost to it.

Read more here.