Australia relies heavily on undersea cables for global communications and financial connectivity; however, experts warn that the country lacks the necessary legal, policy, and operational frameworks to protect or quickly repair them in the event of an attack. Currently, no single government agency is responsible for cable security, and Australia depends on foreign private operators for repairs. This vulnerability is increasingly critical as adversaries gain technology to damage cables at greater depths, according to Colin Clark of Breaking Defense. Experts stress that undersea cables are not just infrastructure, but a core national security concern, requiring coordinated defense, deterrence, and investment—yet budget and capability constraints hinder the Royal Australian Navy’s ability to respond effectively in a crisis. Historical and recent attacks on cables worldwide underscore the need to address this strategic risk. They write:

The vast island continent here depends heavily for data and communications made possible by undersea cables, but Australia lacks the law, policy and capability to protect and repair the vital digital lifelines in the event of attack, experts here say.

“Our connectivity to the global financial system and to family and friends across the world depends on the integrity of around 16 submarine cables that stretch across the seabed from continent to continent, and they plug in at various points along our coastline. […]

The stakes of failing to protect or quickly repair those cables are “existential,” the navy leader said. “The reality we face is that you do not need to invade Australia to defeat Australia. While maritime trade routes and seabed cables are our lifelines, they are also our greatest vulnerabilities. The loss of either would be an existential threat to our island and to our people.” […]

Russia has repeatedly attacked cables in the Baltic over the last few years, several speakers noted. The Baltic incidents “really show that state actors are targeting submarine cable networks and that we should expect similar incidents in our part of the world, and that this is a defense mission, even though there might be some shirking of responsibility amongst Canberra’s agencies,” Bushfield said. “Naval protection isn’t just infrastructure policy, but it’s maritime security. It’s national security and it’s deterrence.” […]

A Royal Australian Navy source, who asked not to be identified because he was not authorized to speak publicly, noted that the service has actually seen its acquisition and operations budgets shrink to some degree in recent years as pensions, medical costs and the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine project have grown. While the service would take on the role of monitoring, defending and repairing cables if ordered, it would lack the resources to do much more than is already being done, the source said.

And, as the experts noted, that is unlikely to be enough in time of war.

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