As President Trump increases U.S. military deployments to the Middle East amid rising tensions with Iran, critics warn this focus risks undermining American priorities in the Indo-Pacific. China has repeatedly exploited U.S. overextension in the region to boost its own strategic position, including advancing influence, avoiding conflict, and securing energy interests. The Trump administration now faces a key decision: de-escalate in the Middle East or risk ceding ground to Beijing in Asia, according to Adham Sahloul of War on the Rocks. The current conflict, especially surrounding Israel and Iran, may further distract the U.S. from countering China’s long-term ambitions. Sahloul writes:
As another carrier strike group steams to the Middle East and F-35 squadrons position themselves in the region with tankers, the American people should think hard about whether President Donald Trump is allowing the Middle East to overshadow blinking red priorities in the Indo-Pacific.
Beijing has systematically exploited America’s Middle East quagmires, turning each crisis into a strategic windfall. The Trump administration now faces a critical choice: de-escalate Middle East tensions or watch China continue capitalizing on Washington’s undisciplined policymaking.
The symbolism of diverting military assets to the Middle East is not lost on Beijing or American allies in the Indo-Pacific. Among audiences where policy statements about freedom of navigation fall flat, U.S. force deployments speak volumes. The Biden and Trump administrations’ Red Sea campaign demonstrated costly strategic overextension for little discernible gain and contributed to a lack of cohesion between the United States and its European and Arab allies in the post-Oct. 7 crisis.
A U.S. destroyer in the Eastern Mediterranean, ostensibly conducting maritime security missions, may be viewed globally as the United States co-signing Israel’s devastating Gaza campaign. China has not missed these costs to America’s reputation and prestige. Beijing leverages each perceived misstep to advance its narrative that U.S. leadership is hypocritical, destabilizing, and declining — costs that multiply if the United States intervenes even in defense of vital national interests. […]
Beijing has built the capabilities to benefit from, rather than resolve, regional crises. China’s military base in Djibouti, rotating naval escort task forces, and modernized military capabilities are intended to enable “far seas” power projection as part of Beijing’s vision of a China-leaning Eurasian continent. […]
Trump would be prudent to learn from recent experience, including that of his first administration: Every Middle East crisis that consumes American attention and resources hands Beijing strategic advantages.
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This dilemma feeds into a broader strategic debate: should the U.S. treat China as a regional threat confined to the Indo-Pacific, or as a global challenge requiring worldwide countermeasures? The answer deeply affects U.S. alliance structures and deterrence strategies in both Europe and Asia, reports Luis Simón of War on the Rocks. While both the Trump and Biden administrations agree that China represents the foremost strategic challenge, they diverge on how to scope and address that threat. This disagreement shapes how Washington balances efforts in places like Ukraine with preparations for a potential conflict in Asia. Analysts have proposed three frameworks for navigating this tension—bifurcation, cooperation, and integration—each offering different ways to manage limited resources while maintaining global influence. A flexible, cross-theater ecosystem of shared capabilities may ultimately provide the adaptability needed to respond to shifting global threats. Simón writes:
Whether the United States defines China as a global threat or a predominantly regional one will have pervasive implications for U.S. alliance and deterrence strategy in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The second Trump and Biden administrations agree on a key fact: China constitutes the most serious and systemic challenge to U.S. power and interests. Yet, they seem to disagree on how to characterize the nature and scale of that challenge. Whereas the Biden administration construed China as a global challenge, the Trump administration regularly emphasizes the centrality of the China threat in the Indo-Pacific.
Against this backdrop, President Donald Trump’s insistence on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine to focus on China has reignited debates about the opportunity costs of supporting versus not supporting Kyiv, and how that may impinge on America’s overall strategic position vis-à-vis Beijing. Three alternative visions for deterrence could help make sense of these dilemmas and their implications for U.S. allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific: bifurcation, cooperation, and integration. […]
At the heart of this trade-offs-versus-payoffs debate lie a series of questions around the nature and scale of the Chinese challenge, which are in many ways reminiscent of Cold War-era debates about the nature of Soviet challenge:
Should China be seen as a regional (i.e. Indo-Pacific) threat or a global one? How much effort should be devoted to countering China in the Indo-Pacific versus countering China elsewhere? How important is it to counter Chinese influence in Europe vis-à-vis other regions? How much energy should be devoted to countering a low-cost Chinese effort to create instability in regions like Europe or the Middle East? And how deep does Sino-Russian strategic cooperation run? […]
The question of whether bifurcation, cooperation, or integration is best for the United States or its different allies, or which is likely to prevail, hinges on a dynamic geostrategic and political context, including factors like U.S. domestic politics, allied preferences, the intensity of the threat in both regions, and the level of coordination between China and Russia. […]
A cross-theater ecosystem upstream offers the versatility to navigate all three ideal-type approaches to deterrence. It would be compatible with bifurcation downstream — U.S. allies could still focus primarily on their respective regions — and premised on cooperation upstream. And it would allow the United States and its allies to dial up towards integration (upstream and/or downstream) according to changes to strategic circumstances, policy preferences, or national interests.
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