Weinberger/Powell Doctrine

Caspar Weinberger and Colin Powell

Originally posted September 5, 2013.

The W/P was first coined by Caspar Weinberger, Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, in a speech at the National Press Club in 1984. As Cato’s Chris Preble outlines, “Weinberger was aided by a rising military officer, Colin Powell, who later adapted the concepts for his own purposes as National Security Adviser for Reagan and later as Chairman of the JCS under George H.W. Bush.”

This morning at the Skeptics, I blogged about a series of questions raised by the ongoing military operations against Libya. But I left room for one big question: Is the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine dead?

Actually, it isn’t a question. It’s a statement: the doctrine that sought to prevent the United States from engaging in risky and counterproductive missions that had nothing to do with protecting U.S. vital interests (e.g. Lebanon 1983; Somalia, 1991; and Kosovo, 1999) is dead. Shovel dirt on it.

To review, the doctrine was first coined by Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, in a speech at the National Press Club in 1984. Weinberger was aided by a rising military officer, Colin Powell, who later adapted the concepts for his own purposes as National Security Adviser for Reagan and later as Chairman of the JCS under George H.W. Bush. The essential elements boil down to five key questions:

The essential elements boil down to five key questions:

Is there a compelling national interest at stake?

Have the costs and consequences of intervention been considered?

Have we exhausted all available options for resolving the problem, i.e. is force a last resort?

Is there a clear and achievable military mission, and therefore a well-defined end state?

Is there strong public support – both domestic and international – for the operation?