Ukraine’s recent drone strike inside Russia shows how asymmetric tactics can disable significant military assets. A similar threat faces the US, as China may hide missiles or drones in civilian shipping containers, launching surprise attacks from commercial vessels near US bases, warns James Kraska and Gavin Logan of War on the Rocks.
This poses urgent legal and strategic challenges. Civilian ships used for military strikes become lawful targets, yet US commanders often lack training in naval warfare law. The US must quickly enhance its maritime intelligence, legal education, and allied coordination to stay ahead of this threat. They write:
Ukraine shocked the world (and the Kremlin especially) when it launched a surprise attack with over a hundred kamikaze drones smuggled into Russia and delivered by unwitting Russian truck drivers to locations near sensitive military bases. If Kyiv’s claims are correct, 34 percent of Russia’s strategic cruise missile carriers were taken out of action.
Imagine if something like this happened to the United States. It’s not so far-fetched. We know, for example, that China possesses adapted civilian shipping containers that can house various missiles. They could enter any port on civilian commercial ships. What if a war with China breaks out by hundreds of these missiles taking out the bulk of the U.S. fleet in American ports on the east and west coasts as well as in Hawaii, all launched from ships operated by COSCO, a Chinese civilian shipping company with known ties to the People’s Liberation Army? What if we were to tell you that their ships already routinely dock within just a few miles from U.S. naval installations? The homeland security threat is real, and the same risks extend to any American military campaign in the Indo-Pacific, where the majority of container ships operate. If the United States is to defend Taiwan or treaty allies like Japan or Korea, the threat of container missiles on board ships poses a new and vexing maritime threat. […]
The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia serve as Beijing’s “fishermen spies.” It has been a decade since the U.S. Naval War College first cast a light on this force and its role in supporting the People’s Liberation Army Navy. More recently, the Naval War College has exposed China’s civilian vehicle ferries, special barges, and cargo ships to support landing force logistics and heavy lift of Chinese troops and armored rolling stock invading Taiwan.
As we mentioned above, China’s greatest advantage with civilian ships, however, may be in hiding theater-range missiles in shipping containers on board container ships. China’s Container-type Sea Defense Combat System presents this new and complex distributed threat. These systems use standard intermodal shipping containers to house powerful weapons, allowing them to blend into civilian maritime traffic and remain concealed until launch. The system was unveiled at the 2022 Zuhai Airshow and requires only a crew of four. It is internally powered, does not need any external support, and reportedly has no electronic emissions. Targeting data is passively downlinked. The system carries up to four missiles, including the YJ-12E supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, YJ-83 medium range subsonic anti-ship cruise missile, YJ-62 long-range subsonic anti-ship cruise missile, PL-16 anti-radiation cruise missile, and the YJ-18E supersonic anti-ship cruise missile.
These “Trojan Horses” could ply international trade routes and enter ports from Long Beach in California to Kaohsiung in Taiwan. Retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer Jim Fanell said, “If this capability is confirmed, it will require a completely new screening regimen for all Chinese-flagged commercial ships bound for U.S. ports.” […]
Finally, there needs to be frank conversations with China, regional allies, and strategic partners about the risks to civilian shipping so that they will play constructive roles in preventing or identifying perfidy, and accepting the legitimacy of Indo-Pacific Command strikes against these ships if they are misused. In 2020, Chief of Naval Operations John Richards, for example, stated that China’s maritime militia fishing vessels may be attacked if they support the People’s Liberation Army Navy during an armed conflict. Similarly, senior leaders must first understand the rules and then engage regionally and globally, so that flag states, ship owners, and operators understand that their vessels can become military objects and could be destroyed in the event they are engaged in perfidy during a naval war. Seafarers should also understand the risks so that both labor and management have a vested interest in exercising due diligence to prevent their ships from being misused. Bilateral and multilateral engagements in Indo-Pacific Command can serve as forums to calibrate expectations regarding the lawful use of civilian merchant ships and the consequences of perfidy. In addition to regional engagement, the United States and its allies should raise these issues at the International Maritime Organization, the UN agency for shipping regulation, and the International Labor Organization, the UN agency with oversight over seafarer safety and welfare.
Just as NATO states are drawn to negotiating new agreements to address security threats, Association of Southeast Asian Nations states are also seeking consensus. However, it is unlikely that a regional instrument will emerge that provides greater clarity and guidance, such as requiring certain classes of cargo ships to be declared in conflict zones, promoting international inspections at sea, or even negotiating new norms around the deployment of containerized weapons. An agreement cannot be completed and if one is adopted, China will not comply. For example, even the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations now acknowledge that the 20-year effort to negotiate a code of conduct with China has stalled. Despite a looming 2026 deadline, no state is confident of reaching an agreement. The purpose of the code of conduct? To provide greater fidelity on compliance with the rules of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. In 2016, an international tribunal composed under the Law of the Sea unanimously determined China was a serial violator of the treaty.
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America’s weak merchant fleet heightens risk—revival and allied cooperation are vital
Compounding the risk is America’s weakness in shipping, which exacerbates the problem. The US has only 185 flagged merchant ships, while China has over 7,800 and dominates the global shipbuilding industry. Blaine Worthington of the Center for International Maritime Security argues that the US must rebuild its maritime sector and work closely with vulnerable allies, such as South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Worthington writes:
The United States has a shipping problem and everybody knows it. […]
The crux of the problem is that the United States cannot compete with Chinese shipping or shipbuilding. The United States flagged merchant fleet currently sits at 185 ships. China (including Hong Kong) has a fleet of 7,838.3 In 2023, the United States built 0.1% of the world’s ships. In the same year, China built 50.7%.4 In 2024, 2.16% of the global merchant fleet was owned by US companies. […]
Finally, this civil maritime coordination will lay the foundation for further cooperation between member states in the event of conflict with China, when the demand for sealift will be acute, and all parties will have a role to play in meeting that need. The time for unilateral and bilateral action has passed. The United States, Australia, South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines should form the Multilateral Maritime Alliance now and break the Chinese stranglehold on maritime industries—before it is too late.
Read more here.
Merchant Ships Could be Durable and Inexpensive Weapon Trucks
Colonel T. X. Hammes, US Marine Corps (Retired), and Captain R. Robinson Harris, US Navy (Retired), of the US Naval Institute, report that one solution already underway is converting commercial container ships into “missile merchants.” These vessels can carry drones, sensors, and long-range missiles, offering firepower and flexibility at a fraction of the cost of a warship. With China’s growing missile advantage, the U.S. must accelerate its efforts to enhance distributed operations and remain competitive in the Indo-Pacific region. They write:
In the past half decade, innovators have heeded calls to increase the Navy’s ship count by putting containerized missiles on merchant ships. They have improved the weapons, drones, and sensors to the point the Navy is experimenting with mounting them on container ships.1 Even so, U.S. politicians, military leaders, and analysts continue to overemphasize the number of destroyers, cruisers, frigates, etc., the Navy needs. But the Navy has acknowledged it cannot meet its goal of 380-plus ships any time soon: In October 2024, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities Vice Admiral James Pitts noted that, if the budget is kept at the projected level, that number would be unobtainable.
Even were the Navy to get the desired 380-ship fleet, there would not be sufficient forward-deployed ships to win a missile fight within range of the antiship missiles of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Yet staying out of range of Chinese missiles would render the surface fleet largely irrelevant and leave allies to fight without U.S. naval support. […]
The number of ships is the wrong metric. Far more important is how many weapons the Navy can bring to bear in a great power confrontation. Retired Navy Captain Wayne Hughes highlighted a fundamental truth about modern naval combat: “Navies are in a new tactical era characterized by missile warfare.” Recent events suggest attack drones should be added to the calculations. […]
Unfortunately, China’s large merchant marine fleet and tens of thousands of fishing vessels could provide the PLA Navy (PLAN) with effectively unlimited launch platforms.9 This makes it all the more important that the United States and regional partners cooperate. Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Australia are already fielding land-based ASCMs that could easily be adapted for containerized systems. Such efforts would reinforce U.S. efforts to protect friends and partners in the East and South China Seas and beyond. […]
In contrast, missile merchants would be low-value platforms of the type historically put at risk in great power conflict—consider the picket ships that screened the U.S. fleet during the Battle of Okinawa. In any naval fight some ships will have to be risked but, unlike those picket ships, missile merchants would pack a considerable offensive punch while being much tougher and needing smaller crews. And, given that electromagnetic sensors could have a hard time distinguishing them from what commercial ship traffic remains at sea, they might be more likely to persist forward.
Converted merchant ships could be durable and inexpensive weapon “trucks.” Given modern containers’ interchangeability, this type of missile ship could become the most easily replaced and upgraded system in a fight.
Read more here.
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