By mila103 @Adobe Stock
Kevin McCranie of War on The Rocks reports that Vice Adm. Brad Cooper of U.S. Central Command recently said, “I think you’d have to go back to World War II where you have ships who are engaged in combat. When I say engaged in combat, where they’re getting shot at, we’re getting shot at, and we’re shooting back.” He writes:
Recently, a journalist questioned Vice Adm. Brad Cooper of U.S. Central command about naval operations in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, “When was the last time that the U.S. Navy operated at this pace for a couple months?” The admiral’s response was telling: “I think you’d have to go back to World War II where you have ships who are engaged in combat. When I say engaged in combat, where they’re getting shot at, we’re getting shot at, and we’re shooting back.” Cooper described the engagements that have occurred since late 2023 with Houthi drones and missiles targeting shipping. The employment of these weapons continues to become more sophisticated with reports indicating that the Houthi launched at least 28 drones on one day in early March alone.
To better understand the conflict between the Houthis and the naval powers protecting shipping in the region, it is important to revisit competing ideas about naval strategy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. One side emphasized traditional fleets and naval power while the other including a group originating in France known as the Jeune École (young school) posited an alternative approach to naval warfare. It relied on small flotilla craft armed with torpedoes to put traditional fleets at risk and expose their commercial shipping to relentless attack. Today, the United States and its naval partners possess the traditional fleet, while it could be argued that the Houthis are reimagining the Jeune École for the 21st century. […]
Currently, engagements in the Red Sea have approximated a stalemate. The naval powers have proven effective at stopping the vast majority of Houthi attacks, albeit by expending costly defensive weapons. Yet, the attacks continue and the commercial costs increase. Historical cases involving the protection of commerce including examples from the Age of Sail and the world wars indicate that this type of stalemate generally breaks in the direction of the stronger naval power as long as it is willing and able over the long term to pay the costs of the defense.
We cannot, however, rely on the easy answer that the past always provides a guide in the present. It is important to consider whether the cost to commercial carriers and the latest technological advances work together to favor a Jeune École-type argument or if navies can sustain their presence and continue to effectively exercise command of the sea.
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