By Gayan @Adobe Stock
China may be developing a new “assassin’s mace” strategy to deter U.S. intervention in a Taiwan conflict, focusing less on direct military strikes and more on strategic deterrence, according to Joel Wuthnow of War on the Rocks. This includes threats to the U.S. homeland via cyber, space, and even nuclear means to make defending Taiwan seem too risky. China’s growing military capabilities—particularly its nuclear arsenal and long-range missiles—enhance this approach. Other tactics include surprise invasions, coercion of U.S. allies, and the dissemination of misinformation. The U.S. is urged to strengthen homeland defense, align it with the Indo-Pacific strategy, and communicate clear deterrence to dissuade Beijing. Wuthnow writes:
Has Beijing found a new “assassin’s mace” to keep the U.S. military out of a fight over Taiwan?
Ongoing debates over how China’s military would counter U.S. intervention often focus on precision strikes against U.S. forces in the Western Pacific. Indeed, some wargames assume that the People’s Liberation Army would throw the first punch. But such a move is not the only option available to China’s decision-makers. Other options include mounting a surprise invasion of Taiwan before the United States can mobilize, pressuring America’s allies to deny U.S. forces access to forward bases, or using strategic deterrence, which seeks to discourage Washington from defending Taiwan in the first place.
Of these options, pursuing strategic deterrence could prove most alluring for Beijing. The logic would be to convince the U.S. government that risks to the U.S. homeland, such as cyber attacks on power grids and telecommunications networks and even the specter of nuclear escalation, are too severe to contemplate. This strategy would leverage China’s expanding nuclear arsenal (and attendant nuclear signals), new intercontinental conventional missiles, space and cyber capabilities, and the belief that Beijing is inherently more resolved than Washington. […]
For the past two decades, Chinese military observers have discussed such kinetic and non-kinetic strikes as being integral to “system destruction warfare.” The goal of system destruction warfare is to destroy an adversary’s critical military systems — intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance; logistics nodes; command and control; and combat generation platforms, such as aircraft carriers — while protecting one’s own assets. […]
The two sides could also resume expert-level dialogues on strategic stability, which could involve crisis simulations and case studies to communicate to China the risks of inadvertent nuclear, space, and cyber escalation that could result from crisis signaling. This could impart a valuable lesson to Beijing, namely that such threats bring escalatory risks.
Finally, the next National Defense Strategy should consider the role that reassurance should play. As Thomas Schelling argued, deterrence and assurance are interrelated. Beijing should be assured that the United States will not change its policy to formally recognize Taiwan’s independence — a clear red line for China — if Beijing refrains from aggressive military action across the strait.
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