Could China Use Trump’s Trade War to Gain Influence in Southeast Asia?

By francodelgrando @Adobe Stock

Jessica C. Liao and Lucas Myers, writing for War on the Rocks, argue that Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Southeast Asia highlights China’s expanding dominance in the region, as U.S. influence declines due to rising tariffs and the absence of a clear economic agenda. While Beijing strengthens its position through trade and diplomacy, Washington’s emphasis on military posturing offers little alternative. With traditional hedging strategies losing effectiveness, Southeast Asia faces growing pressure to align with China’s vision of regional leadership. They write:

Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s recent visit to three Southeast Asian countries drew widespread headlines — not only for diplomatic pageantry but also for its timing. The visit came on the heels of President Donald Trump’s announcement of a sweeping “reciprocal tariff” policy, which disproportionately affects Southeast Asian economies. Media coverage of Xi’s trip largely focused on Beijing’s attempts to capitalize on Washington’s recent missteps. Mostly undiscussed was the region’s longer-term reality: China has already entrenched itself as the predominant power in Southeast Asia, a region Beijing has long regarded as vital to its political and strategic survival.

This view was reaffirmed during the Chinese Communist Party’s April 8 Politburo Work Conference on Neighboring Relations, occurring just before Xi’s tour. Last held in 2013 shortly after Xi assumed power, the conference aimed to send a clear message that stable, friendly ties with Southeast Asia are not only a foreign policy priority but a prerequisite for China’s long-term development strategy. As the latest conference revealed, Beijing puts a great deal of emphasis on framing deepening ties with neighboring countries — including those in Southeast Asia — over the past decade as one of its greatest foreign policy successes. […]

Since the Reform and Opening Up era accelerated in the 1980s and 90s, Beijing has regarded peaceful and stable relations with the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) as essential. China’s 1994 Spratly Islands dispute with the Philippines gave rise to Beijing’s “Good Neighbor” policy. While 2002 is often remembered for the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, it was also the year Beijing signed its first free trade agreement with the bloc, which offered trade concessions to improve bilateral ties and was gradually expanded to cover integration in services and investment. […]

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s May 2025 visit to the region and triumphant tone at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue security forum intended to signal U.S. focus on the Indo-Pacific and reassure regional actors. Instead, his emphasis on increased military spending, burden sharing, the “imminent” threat to Taiwan, and black-and-white rhetoric exposed the fundamental problem: U.S. policy rests solely upon its security commitments at the expense of a credible economic strategy. This plays precisely into China’s strategy and advantages in the region.

This does not mean that individual Southeast Asian states simply give up opportunities to buck China. The Philippines under Marcos has taken to confrontation and actively sought cooperation with outside security partners. However, the issue is that this effort is increasingly a daunting task, given the long-standing U.S. security commitments are more in question than ever and none of the other options — Australia, Japan, India, or the European Union — can effectively outweigh China. The fundamental problem is one of scale. Without a competent Washington, and absent an Association of Southeast Asian Nations capable of unified hedging, Southeast Asian countries cannot effectively stand up to Beijing. It is unfortunately safe to say that hedging will likely fail to stop the Middle Kingdom’s return to regional domination.

Read more here.