James Holmes from The National Interest argues that China’s DF-27 antiship ballistic missile is not a revolutionary new form of naval power, but rather the modern culmination of a long-standing “fortress-fleet” strategy enabled by advances in sensors, computing, and precision weapons. While Pentagon reporting downplays the missile’s impact and US defenses may blunt its effectiveness at extreme ranges, the DF-27 could still significantly alter strategic calculations by extending China’s ability to threaten US bases and naval forces far from its shores.

Drawing on historical parallels from Alfred Thayer Mahan and the Russo-Japanese War, the author contends that long-range, land-based firepower can offset naval inferiority and expand China’s effective sea control. Ultimately, the DF-27 strengthens the PLA Navy by allowing China’s joint forces to challenge US power projection in the Western Pacific, even if the US Navy remains superior ship-for-ship. Holmes writes:

All respect to my colleague and friend Professor Andrew Erickson, but China’s DF-27 antiship ballistic missile does not represent “a new form of naval force,” as he wrote in USNI News last month. It is intimately familiar, and more ominous for all that. It represents the latest in a centuries-old form of naval force approaching its apex potential thanks to advances in sensor, computer, and weapons technology backed by the willpower and resources of a prosperous, ambitious, and increasingly domineering maritime power. Everything old is new again.

That being the case, it’s worth looking back in time to peer through the sea of fog that obscures the future of martial affairs. […]

Three quick observations. First, the report’s framers may be deliberately softpedaling the missile’s capability. Why they would do so is a mystery, but a few plausible candidate explanations come to mind. Politics is one. Of late the Trump administration has swerved toward nurturing more cordial relations with Xi Jinping’s Chinese Communist Party leadership. That being the case, Washington may not want to draw attention to PLA weaponry apt to alarm the American populace, their elected representatives, or allies, partners, and friends, lest the new charm offensive founder on the rocky crags of popular opinion. The White House’s wishes shape what the Pentagon, a political implement, does—including setting the tone for official reports pertaining to martial and diplomatic affairs. […]

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