By Victor zastol’skiy @Adobe Stock
Samuele C. A. Abrami and Riccardo Gasco of War on the Rocks report that the fall of Assad could reopen Turkey’s Kurdish Pandora’s Box. They write:
“Snow has fallen on the mountains you dreamed of.” This Turkish saying describes a situation where something that was long hoped for or dreamed of has finally become reality, but it comes with unexpected challenges, risks, or disappointments.
And this seems to be the situation in front of Turkey after Syrian rebel forces put an end to the 50-year-long Assad regime. On the one hand, what happened earlier this month probably went beyond any of Ankara’s “wildest dreams”: achieving regime change in Damascus, taming Russian and Iranian influence, curbing the “Kurdish threat” at its borders, and allowing for the mass return of Syrian refugees. On the other hand, however, things could go sideways. First, while its support for the Syrian National Army and contacts with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham provide Turkey with leverage in the future power transition in Syria, the challenge is to ensure that the puzzle fits together without drastic setbacks. Second, considering the uncertainty about the incoming Trump administration, yet to be seen is the role of Ankara’s competitors, especially pro-Kurdish groups such as the U.S.-backed People’s Protection Units and the Syrian Democratic Forces.
As a matter of fact, Turkey’s leadership seems to be satisfied with the latest developments. Nonetheless, as its regional equation implies facilitating a smooth sociopolitical transition in Damascus but also the fight against the “Kurdish terrorist corridor,” it is highly likely that this evolutionary phase will have significant implications for Turkey’s own Kurdish equation. […]
In Turkey, the Kurdish question historically resembles a Pandora’s box that can be opened, broken, or hidden in different periods by several actors and for multiple reasons. Indeed, Turkish citizens and observers of Turkish politics are accustomed to the cyclical phases of tension and rapprochement in the government’s relationship with the Kurds. Still, in October many were surprised when the Turkish government made a new call for normalization to various segments of the Kurdish leadership. It was surprising because it came from Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party. It was even more astonishing because it was directly addressed to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party — considered a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and many Western countries — and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, who has been imprisoned by Turkey since 1999. Was it a genuine move to reverse the negative trend since the break of the peace process in 2015? Or is it just another strategy dictated by the political calculations of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party? […]
At the domestic-regional nexus, the alleged divergent views between the Iraqi and Syrian divisions of the Kurdistan Workers Party also underscore how Öcalan likely no longer possesses the full ability to influence the entirety of the movement. While the founder has called on the movement’s members to lay down their weapons, some stick with the original violent tactics. On the regional front, much will depend on developments in Syria, especially the progress of the transitional government and the role that Ankara could play. Furthermore, it will take several months to discern how the United States intends to manage its stance on the matter and its broader Middle Eastern policies. This might result in new green lights from Trump for Turkish military operations, as in 2019, or a more proactive stance in which Washington could promote this renovated peace process to avoid any further escalation during the power transition in Syria. For a start, the United States could try to press the Syrian Democratic Forces to clearly detach from the Kurdistan Workers Party’s violent positions and overtly stand for Syria’s territorial integrity. In this regard, it is unpredictable whether the latest alleged preoccupation in Washington about limiting the scope of Kurdish autonomy would also address some of Turkey’s concerns. However, it will be challenging to appease Turkey’s position on the security side of the equation, as demonstrated by the recent military build-up across the areas dominated by Kurdish groups. First, Ankara views the party founded by Öcalan and its Syrian offshoot as part of the same movement, and the country’s nationalistic milieu makes it unthinkable for Turkish leaders to accept any sort of empowerment of Kurdish zones inside Syria. Second, it is worth noting that any increase in the Turkish army’s military operations against Kurdish militias in Iraq and Syria triggers a rally-around-the-flag effect within Turkish society that helps the government draw bipartisan support against an evergreen matter of “national survival.”
Nevertheless, with no roadmap in sight and the uncertain situation in Syria, the Kurdish issue will remain a central and unresolved challenge influencing Turkey’s domestic politics, regional strategies, and international relations. Whether Pandora’s box reopens, remains sealed, or shatters largely depends on these three elements of the equation aligning or continuing to diverge.
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